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LAST CLEAR CHANCE-SOME FURTHER OBSERVATIONS
ROBE.T T. DoNIye*
SOIVE eleven years ago the writer endeavored to collect and
analyze all the West Virginia cases decided prior to 1931 which
dealt with the doctrine of last clear chance.1 Since that time four-
teen cases involving it have been decided.
Statistically, the record of the trial courts is unimpressive. Of
the fourteen cases, three have been reversed because of erroneous
instructions attempting to apply the doctrine ;2 one has been re-
versed for failure to instruct upon it ;3 five have been reversed be-
cause of lack of evidence and one affirmed for the same reason (no
sufficient interval of time) ;4 and four have been affirmed as proper
applications of the doctrine.'
The fact that quite recent decisions have reversed extra-
ordinarily competent trial judges, in cases tried by able counsel,
indicates the confusion and misunderstanding of the profession.
It is this fact, plus the fact that this is the centennial of Davies v.
Mann,6 which has prompted the writer, (with the hope that it will
be instructive rather than merely interesting),7 to write this article.
Its object is to state the present position of the court and to make a
comparison thereof with the principles promulgated by the Restate-
ment of Torts.8
*Instructor in Law, West Virginia University; member of the Monongalia
County bar.
'Donley, Observations on Last Clear Chance in West Virginia (1931) 37
W. VA. L. Q. 362.
2 Meyn v. Dulaney-Miller Auto Co., 118 W. Va. 545, 191 S. B. 558 (1937);
Lynch v. Alderton, 20 S. E. (2d) 657 (W. Va. 1942); Bowman v. Monongahela
West Penn Public Service Co., 21 S. E. (2d) 148 (W. Va. 1942).
3 Fielder v. Service Cab Co., 122 W. Va. 522, 11 S. E. (2d) 115 (1940).
4 Juergens v. Front, 111 W. Va. 670, 163 S. E. 618 (1932) ; Nutter v. C. &
0. Ry., 113 W.Va. 94, 116 S. E. 815 (1932); Milby v. Diggs, 118 W. Va. 56,
189 S. E. 107 (1936) ; Morton v. Baber, 118 W. Va. 457, 190 S. E. 767 (1937) ;
Bean v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 121 W. Va. 105, 1 S. E. (2d) 881 (1939); Ray
v. Clawson, 14 S. E. (2d) 259 (W. Va. 1941).
5 Smith v. Gould, 110 W. Va. 579, 159 S. E. 53 (1931) ; Davenport v. Haupt,
113 W. Va. 595, 169 S. E. 333 (1933); Jacobson, Adm'x v. Hamill, 120 W. Va.
491, 199 S. E. 593 (1938); Emery v. Monongahela West Penn Public Service
Co., 111 W. Va. 699, 163 S. E. 620 (1932) (rev'd on other grouinds).
a 10 M. & W. 546 (1842).
7 In Smith v. Gould, supra note 5, at 587, 159 S. E. at 57, the court said that
the writer's former article, supra note 1, was " Iinteresting,".
8"See. 479. DEFENDANT'S LAST CLEAR CHANCE.
A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk of harm
from the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm caused
thereby if, immediately preceding the harm,
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable
1
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The plainest type of case may be used as a basis for discus-
sion. It is that of the plaintiff who has negligently placed himself
in a position of helpless peril, i. e., one from which (whether con-
scious thereof or not) he cannot extricate himself. His position is
actually discovered and his peril realized by the defendant, who
thereafter fails to use the means then at hand to avoid the injury.
For example, the plaintiff has negligently stumbled and is lying
senseless upon defendant's public railroad crossing. The engine-
man sees the plaintiff but negligently fails to apply the brakes in
time to avoid striking him. Liability is imposed, for in a sense the
plaintiff is at the mercy of the defendant.
The next type of case is equally clear. Suppose that the
engineman does not see plaintiff, but had the former discharged
his duty of care to maintain a vigilant watch, he would have seen
the plaintiff in time to have applied the brakes so as to avoid the
injury. Here, also, liability is imposed. The defendant may be in
no better position if the engineman testifies that he looked vigilantly,
but did not in fact see the plaintiff, if, judged objectively, a
hypothetical, ordinary engineman would have seen under the same
or similar circumstances.10  Emery v. Monongahela West Penn Pub-
vigilance and care, and
(b) the defendant
(i) knows of the plahitiff's situation and realizes the help-
less peril involved therein; or(ii) knows of the plaintiff's situation and has reason to
realize the peril involved therein; or(iii) would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and thus
had reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless peril had he exer-
cised the vigilance which it was his duty to exercise, and(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care
and competence his then existing ability to avoid harming the
plaintiff."
"See. 480. LAST CLEAR CHANCE; NEGLIGENTLY INATTENTIVE
PLAINTIFF.
A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance could have ob-
served the danger created by the defendant's negligence in time to have
avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, but only if, the defendant
(a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and
(b) realized or had reason to realize that the plaintiff was inattentive
and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to avoid the
harm, and(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care
and competence his then existing ability to avoid harming the
plaintiff."
9 HARP, TORTS (1933) § 139.
10 "1The law ordinarily charges a person of unimpaired vision with seeing
an object 'which if he had used his senses, he in the nature of things must have
seen' ". Craft v. Fordson Coal Co., 114 W. Va. 295, 171 S. E. 886 (1933).
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lic Service Co.," and Fielder v. Service Cab Co.,'1 are representative
of the case of actually discovered peril, and Davenport v. Haupt 3
of the case of peril which could have been discovered. In result,
at least, they are in accord with the principles laid down in the Re-
statement.
So much seems clear enough, but here the difficulties begin.
If the locomotive brakes are defective so that the train cannot be
stopped by applying them immediately after the plaintiff's peril is
discovered and realized (actually or constructively), there is no
liability, even though it be shown that efficient brakes would have
permitted avoidance of the injury. It is said that there is, in fact,
no clear chance to avoid the harm. The defendant will not be held
liable for its antecedent negligence in failing to provide proper
brakes.,4
On the other hand, the Restatement takes the position that if
the locomotive headlight is defective (but the brakes sufficient)
the defendant is liable if a proper headlight would have revealed
plaintiff's peril in time to permit avoidance of the injury by ap-
plication of the proper brakes.'5 In the inaccurate language of the
street, it will be asked: why should it be "more negligent" to
operate a locomotive with defective headlights than with defective
brakes? The answer given by cases so holding 6 is that the duty of
vigilance to discover the helpless peril of others is a "continuing"
one and cannot be fulfilled in the absence of means to make that
vigilance effective. But, it is said, the duty to apply brakes is
not a continuing one; it arises only when the helpless peril of others
is actually discovered, or should have been discovered, and the
peril realized. And that duty is fulfilled by applying them; by
using the then available means to avoid the injury.'Y The validity
of this distinction is doubtful. If the duty to avoid discovered peril
is fulfilled even in the absence of means to make that avoidance
11 9upra note 4.
12 Supra note 3.
13 Supra note 5.
14 2 RESTATEiENT, ToaTs (1934) 1256, comment f.
5 Ibid. HARPEn, Tors 308.
l1Dent v. Bellows Falls Ry., 95 Vt. 523, 116 Atl. 83 (1922); Lloyd v.
Albermarle Ry., 118 N. C. 1010, 24 S. B. 805 (1896). See COMMENTARIES ON
RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS, Tentative Draft No. 10, § 15, page 71.
'7 The West Virginia court apparently rejects the rule of antecedent negli-
gence. See Juergens v. Front, supra note 4, and the other cases cited therein,
that the doctrine "implies a sufficient interval of time for both appreciation
of the dangerous situation and effective effort to relieve it". No exception is
stated to cover the case wherein the effort would have been effective, in the
given interval of time, had there been no antecedent negligence.
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effective, it would seem to be equally true that the duty of vigilance
is fulfilled even in the absence of means to make that vigilance effec-
tive.21
Some rather anomalous results follow from the logic of these
principles. "Under the formula, it will be seen, it is sometimes true
that the greater the defendant's negligence, the less its liability.
The trolley company may be held for its motorman's failure to
look. But if we add to this failure enough other negligence (e. g., as
to speed, or equipment) so that looking would not do any good,
the trolley company will be let off. Similarly, if the motorman
does look and is careful, the company cannot be held where de-
fective equipment renders his care unavailing. It is 'in a better
position when [it has] supplied a bad brake but a good motorman,
than when the motorman [is] careless but the brake efficient.' ,,19
So much, then, for the cases in which the plaintiff, conscious or
unconscious of his peril, cannot extricate himself therefrom. Still
greater difficulty and confusion have arisen in the other type of
case: that of the negligently inattentive plaintiff. He has placed
himself in a position of peril, not a helpless one, but one from
which, up to a point, he could have escaped had he performed his
duty of vigilance to discover his situation. Plainly, if the de-
fendant does not actually perceive2 0 the plaintiff's situation, and
also actually realize, or- as a reasonable man -should realize,
that thd plaintiff is inattentive and thus in peril, there is no
liability. There are what may be termed concurrent breaches of
equally balancing duties of vigilance. To hold otherwise would re-
quire the defendant to exercise greater vigilance to discover the
plaintiff's situation than the latter is required to exercise to dis-
cover it.2 But, if the defendant actually sees the plaintiff's situa-
tion and realizes, or, as a reasonable man under the circumstances
should realize the plaintiff's inattention, then a new duty arises
to exercise the then available means to avoid the injury.
is The position taken by the Restatement is supported by HAPR, op. cit.
supra note 9, but is said to be contra to the weight of authority: James, Last
Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine (1938) 47 YAiE L. J. 704, 714.
'oId. at page 710, quoting from British Columbia El. Ry. v. Loach, [1916]
1 A. C. 719, 727.
2o While the rule requires actual knowledge upon the part of the defendant,
under the rule of Craft v. Fordson Coal Co., 114 W. Va. 295, 171 S. E. 886
(1933), his denial of knowledge may be useless.
21 This is the basic criticism to which Smith v. Gould, 110 W. Va. 579, 159
S. E. 53 (1931), is subject. While the court still pays lip service to that case,
it was limited to the situation of discovered peril by Meyn v. Dulaney-Miller
Auto Co., 118 W. Va. 545, 191 S. E. 558 (1937).
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1942], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol49/iss1/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
It is important to note the separation in fact and in time be-
tween the physical act of perceiving the plaintiff's situation, and
the mental process of realizing the peril involved. Thus, a motorist
approaching a pedestrian who is crossing a street may, in the absence
of indications to the contrary, rightfully assume that he will not
step into, or will step out of, the path of the car.21 As the car
approaches and the pedestrian continues in a situation of increasing
danger, a place will be reached at which the motorist should realize
that it is developing to the point of peril unless appropriate action
be taken. The mere blowing of the horn may be an act which,
under the given circumstances, will be considered a sufficient dis-
charge of the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid harm. How-
ever, if this produces no perceptible effect upon the pedestrian,
further reasonable measures to avoid the injury will be required
within the then existing ability of the motorist.
The case of Smith v. Gould2" has had a disturbing and un-
settling effect upon the doctrine in this state. If, as Hatcher, J.,
contended in the dissenting opinion, the facts are those of a case
of mutual unconsciousness of peril, then the decision cannot be sup-
ported either upon principle or sound authority. Quite ironically,
in that case the defendant's liability is traceable to the fact that
he used some care but not enough. If he had failed to look at all,
being completely careless, or had falsely so testified, he could have
escaped liability. A cynical observer might cite this as an example
of the law's reward for carelessness or for perjury. However, it
must be remembered that the plaintiff was also careless; and that
the validity of a legal principal is to be tested by its application to
the facts proved at the trial rather than as they are.
Nevertheless, in West Virginia, in cases of this type, the de-
fendant who says that he looked but did not see may be in a worse
position than the defendant who made no effort whatever to look.
"The law ordinarily charges a person of unimpaired vision with
seeing an object 'which if he had used his senses, he in the nature
of things must have seen' ".'
Whatever support Smith v. Gould may have given to a doc-
trine imposing liability in cases of mutual unconsciousness was
2Cf. Nutter v. C. & 0. Ry., 113 W. Va. 91, 166 S. E. 815 (1932), to the
effect that a locomotive engineman is under no duty to anticipate that the
plaintiff would step into the path of the train.
23 Supra note 5.
24 Craft v. Fordson Coal Co., 114 W. Va. 295, 171 S. E. 886 (1933). How
far this principle will be extended is yet undetermined.
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withdrawn by Meyn v. Dulaney-Miller Auto Co., 21 the actual de-
cision in which, as set forth in the opinion and embodied in the
syllabus, is limited in conformity to the rules of Sec. 480 of the
Restatement. A dictum also cites with approval the rules of Sec.
479, which dictum was in turn approved in the subsequent case of
Fielder v. Service Cab Co.20 Thus, it seemed that these two cases
had settled the doctrine in this state in conformity with the rules
of the Restatement. It remains to be seen, however, when the ques-
tion is squarely presented in the future, whether or not the court
will follow the distinctions between the various kinds of antecedent
negligence, hereinbefore discussed.
Although the doctrine was seemingly thus settled, a dis-
turbing confusion is found in the language of the syllabus of the
subsequent case of Lynch v. Alderton.2 The opinion, however, is
clear and well considered. The syllabus states that the doctrine will
apply "where and only where such defendant, with knowledge of,
or in circumstances where, by the exercise of reasonable prudence,
he should have knowledge of the plaintiff's peril, his inability to
extricate himself therefrom, or that he was apparently oblivious of
his danger, and then fails to exercise reasonable care in the sur-
rounding circumstances to avoid injury to the plaintiff; or where a
negligent plaintiff, in a position of peril, can escape therefrom, but
the defendant actually saw the plaintiff's peril in time to avert his
injury and failed to take steps necessary to do so".
The confusion arises as a matter of grammatical construction.
Thus, the syllabus 28 can be interpreted to read, in part: "where the
defendant should have knowledge of the plaintiff's peril and that
he was apparently oblivious of his danger". This would permit
recovery in mutual unconsciousness cases, where the plaintiff is
oblivious of his danger and the defendant was likewise oblivious
but should have known of the plaintiff's situation. Furthermore,
the last clause of the syllabus, literally construed, would permit re-
covery by a plaintiff who is able to escape from his peril. This
language must be taken to refer to a case in which the plaintiff was
actually unaware of his peril, but had he been aware, he could have
escaped, i. e., the negligently inattentive plaintiff.
2'upra note 2.
28 Supra note 3.
27 ,Supra note 2.
28 The writer leaves to others the decision of the question "Is the syllabus
the law of the case?" See Hardman, "The Syllabus Is The Law"-An-
other Word by Fox, J. (1941) 48 W. Va. L. Q. 55.
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The rule was again rephrased in Bowman v. Monongahela
West Penn Public Service Co.,29 thus: " ... if, as a proximate con-
sequence of his own contributory negligence, plaintiff is confronted
with an imminent danger of which he is obviously oblivious or from
which he plainly cannot extricate himself, it is the duty of the de-
fendant, if conscious of plaintiff's peril, or if by the exercise of rea-
sonable care he should be so conscious, to exercise reasonable care
under the circumstances to avoid injuring him."
Here, again, as a matter of grammatical construction, this
could be interpreted to read, in part, that where a plaintiff is in
"imminent danger of which he is obviously oblivious," it is the
duty of the defendant to avoid injuring him, if the latter, by the
exercise of reasonable care, should be conscious of plaintiff's
obliviousness to peril. This is open to the same objection previous-
ly stated. It would allow recovery in the mutual unconsciousness
type of case.
The Bowman case was reversed upon the ground that the in-
struction omitted reference to the defendant's realization of the
plaintiff's peril, or his lack of care in not having realized it. It is
significant that, in the syllabus of the Lynch. case, the words "real-
ization" or "realize" do not appear. Consequently, it may be
that the trial court, relying upon that syllabus as a complete state-
ment of the doctrine, was thus led into error in giving the in-
struction.
It is submitted that much of the current misunderstanding is
traceable to the notion that there is but one doctrine of last clear
chance which will apply to all types of cases. Analysis shows that
different rules apply to (a) the case of the plaintiff who, attentive
or inattentive, cannot extricate himself, and (b) the case of the
plaintiff who is in a perilous position by reason of his inattentive-
ness.
Thus, in the Bowman "ease, one of actually discovered peril
from which the plaintiff could not extricate herself, the court cites
in support of its decision the Lynch case, one of an inattentive plain-
tiff of whose situation the defendant could not have become aware
by the exercise of due care.
On the whole, it is submitted that the court has reached cor-
rect results in its applications of the doctrine, 0 with the exception
20 Supra note 2.
30 It is curious that the doctrine was not mentioned in the case of Connelly
v. Virginian Ry., 20 S. . (2d) 885 (W. Va. 1942), holding that a railroad
company is not liable for the death of a trespasser who was struck while asleep
7
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of Smith v. Gould. However, a lack of uniformity in stating the
doctrine has apparently misled the trial courts. It is believed that
the least confusing statement is that contained in Meyn v. Dulaney-
Milter Auto Co. Much would be gained if the court would adopt
and strictly adhere to a formula for stating the doctrine in instruc-
tions. This would eliminate a prolific source of reversals and new
tiials, and the chance for error would be confined to the determina-
tion of whether or not the evidence justified an instruction.
on the end of a railroad tie, until actual discovery of his presence in time to
avoid striking him. Riley, J, dissented upon the ground (a) that there was
a duty of vigilance to discover a helpless trespasser, and (b) that the evidence
showed that the defendant's employees were actually maintaining a lookout
and had an unobstructed view of the the track for such a distance as would
have enabled them to stop the train. Nor, was any mention made in the
opinion or in the dissent of the rule of Craft v. Fordson Coal Co., 114 W. Va.
295, 171 S. E. 886 (1933). If, applying that rule, the trainmen are chargeable
with having seen what was plainly visible, the point at which they could have
seen the decedent becomes, in law, the point at which they actually did see
him (their denial to the contrary being of no legal effect). It is from this
point, then, that the interval of time should be measured to determine
whether (a) the trainmen realized or should have realized the decedent's help-
less peril and (b) thereafter the trainmen were negligent in failing to stop
the train.
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